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E. -H. W. Kluge*

The Right to Life
of Potential Persons

I. Introduction
The law accords an individual the right to sue for damages sustained
in utero when these damages are the result of what would otherwise
be described as criminally negligent treatment. Recent court actions
involving children subjected to the influence of thalidomide during
certain critical stages of their fetal development 1 make this only too
clear. 2 At the same time, however, the law also permits abortion:
*E.-H. W. Kluge, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Victoria
This paper develops a suggestion made by the author in his recent book, The
Practiceof Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) at 20, n.20
1. The damage (injury) is engendered by the action of the drug when ingested by
the mother during the first trimester of the gestation period. For a thorough
discussion of this, see H. B. Taussig, The Thalidomide Syndrome (1962), 207
Scientific American 29. See also Laurence Lader, Abortion (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1966) at 10-16
2. Cf. Henry v. Richardson-MerrillInc. (1975), 508 F. 2d 28 (U.S.C.A., 3d
Circ.). The juridical basis of the claim lay in the New Jersey tolling statute,
N.J.S.A., s.2A: 14-2 1, which provides that:
If any person entitled to any of the actions or proceedings specified in section
2A:14-1 to 2A:14-8 or sections 2A:14-6 to 2A:14-20 of this title orto a right or
title of entry under section 2A: 14-6 of this title is or shall be, at the time of any
such cause of action or right or title accruing, under the age of 21 years, or
insane, such person may commence such action or make such entry, within such
time as limited by said sections, after his coming to be or being offull age or of
sound mind [emphasis added].
Presumably, in the light ofRoe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, the defendant could
have argued that the suit should have been dismissed because of the absence of any
right or title accruing to the infant who had "suffered [personal injuries] as a result
of his mother's ingestion of thalidomide during pregnancy" (Henry v.
Richardson-MerrillInc., id. at 30), because at "the time of such cause" - i.e., at
the time of the action of the drug - the infant was not a person, actually or legally,
and therefore did not enjoy the protection of the various amendments of the
Constitution. However, the defendant did not do so, and the opinion of Circuit
Judge J. Hunter III, expressing the majority opinion, clearly recognized the right of
the infant. In fact, during the whole proceedings, the legitimacy of this was never
questioned. Cf. Henry v. Richardson-MerrillInc. (1973), 366 Fed. Supp. 1192
(U.S. Dist. Ct., N.J.), where the Court took explicit cognizance of Article 1053 of
the Quebec Civil Code as interpreted to the effect that a minor has "the right to
bring a tort action for prenatal injuries". The Court also noted with favour the
Justinian principle, quoted in the precedent case, Montreal Tramways Co. v.
Liveilli, [1933] S.C.R. 456, on which this interpretation was explicitly based.
That principle, codified in Digest of Justinian, lib. I, tit. 5, ss. 7 and 26, reads at
26:
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the deliberate and intentional killing of fetuses at precisely those
stages of their development at which thalidomide damage would be
sustained were the drug to be administered. 3 In adopting these two
stances, the law appears to find itself in a position of conflict. For
the right to sue for damages is reserved solely for those individuals
which in one sense or another are persons; 4 and in taking a
favourable stance in the thalidomide cases, 5 the law seems to be
operating on the principle that those individuals who suffer
morphological damage as a result of exposure to the drug in fact
enjoyed the status of persons at that particular time. On the other
hand, in permitting abortions to occur at that particular stage of fetal
development, the law seems to be operating on the principle that
these individuals are not yet persons; 6 for otherwise, the act of
abortion would be one of murder.
Primafacie, therefore, we are here faced with an anomaly, and
the question arises, how it may be resolved. Several suggestions
immediately come to mind. For instance, one could argue that
fetuses are not persons and have no rights whatever; that only
actually developed fetuses are persons who then do have rights. In
that case the right to sue for damages would be a retroactive right
attaching only to those individuals that have acquired personhood
by surviving their uterine stay. 7 Alternatively, one could argue that
Qui in utero sunt in toto paenejure civili intelligunturin rerum naturaesse.
and, particularly importantly, at 7:
Qui in utero est, perinde ac si in rebus humanis esset, custoditur quoties di
commodis ipsiuspartasquaeritur.
In allowing the action to go forward, the Court was plainly in accord with s. 7
above. See also Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc. (1973), 63 N.J. 130; 305 A 2d 412
(N.J.S.C.)
3. Cf. the United States Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S.
113
4. See, supra, note 1. For other statutes that may be considered guiding in light of
Henry v. Richardson Merrill, see Civil Code of Quebec, articles 337, 338, 345,
608, etc. See also I.C. Aubry et C. Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Franfais(5th ed.
Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1897) para. 53 at 262 ("...[P]ar une fiction des lois
civiles, il est consid~r6 comme 6tant d~jA n6, en tant du moins que son int&et
l'exige.") and Lord Atkinson in Villar v. Gilbey, [1907) A.C. 139 (H.L.). The
Justinian principle seems to be operative here, especially s. 7.
5. Although the decision in New Jersey was negative, the suit was dismissed not
because of lack of right or title but because of lack of interest on part of the State of
New Jersey. Out-of-court settlements in Great Britain in the various thalidomide
cases clearly indicate that the right or title is there. Once more, in all cases the
Justinian principle seems to be operative.
6. Cf. majority opinion in Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113
7. This could be taken as underlying the decision in Roe v. Wade (id.). However,
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fetuses are potential persons and, therefore, do have rights, but that
being merely potential persons they do not have the same rights as
actual persons. Therefore, while they may have the right to normal
development and non-negligent treatment, they do not have the
right to life.
In fact, we can imagine all sorts of other suggestions involving
variations on the notion of personhood, rights attaching to persons
as opposed to potential persons, the ordering of such rights, the
notion of retroactive rights, and so on. However, the law is so
encrusted with purely administrative and pragmatic considerations
that it is easy to lose sight of the really substantive moral issues that
underly the conflict that I have sketched. Consequently, I think that
clarity would be best served if I began by considering those issues
independently of their purely legal ramifications and instead
addressed myself to the moral and philosophical parameters
involved. Therefore I propose to consider first the moral status of a
fetus vis-&-vis the question, Is it a person? Then I shall address
myself to the question, Do only persons have rights, or do potential
persons have rights as well? Subsequent to this, I shall consider the
issue of whether or not the right to life and the right to non-negligent
treatment can be had independently of each other. And finally, I
shall return to the initial legal anomaly in order to see whether or not
it is amenable to solution.
II. The Fetus: PersonorPotentialPerson?
Is a fetus a person or is it a potential person only? In a rather obvious
sense, the reply to this question depends on the definition of
personhood that we are willing to accept. If by "person" we mean a
fully developed member of the species homo sapiens, then, clearly,
a fetus is not a person. It is a potential person at best. It lacks the
morphological features generally found in developed individuals of
that species and can lay claim to them only with respect" to
potentiality. The genetic foundation necessary for their realization is
present, but that realization has not occurred as yet. To draw an
analogy to clarify the issue, while a tadpole is unquestionably a
as I shall argue below, this would lead to a dilemma: either the right or title is

acquired in a retroactive manner at birth which would raise logical difficulties with
respect to the nature of the action and of the right connected with it, or it depends
on the legal fiction that the injury occurs at time of birth which would contravene
facts and in any case fly in the face of the intent as well as letter of the various
tolling statutes.

840 The Dalhousie Law Journal

potential frog, as such it is not yet a frog, and to consider it such
would be absurd.
On the other hand, this very example of the tadpole may itself be
construed in another way; i.e., it may lend impetus to the desire to
accord actual personhood to a fetus. For, so the reply could rn,
surely a tadpole is a frog; that is to say, surely it belongs to the
species rana pipiens throughout its phylogenetic development and is
one and the same individual throughout the whole course of its
biological career. Therefore, does it not follow from this that like a
tadpole, a fetus ought to be treated in the same way throughout its
career?
In other words, the argument could proceed along the following
lines: given an organism that goes through various morphological
changes in the course of its development prior to reaching a full
realization of its genetic potential, it is not possible to single out any
one part or stage of that development as the point at which it realizes
this potential or as the stage at which it ceases to be merely a
potential and becomes a 4) in actuality. Nor should we want to, for
in actual fact the organism is a I all along. The ascription of
potentiality is really not at all with respect to its 1-hood, for that is
never in doubt. Instead, it is with respect to the final external and
morphological evidence of (characteristic of) its 1-hood, which of
course will obtain later in its career. In fact, given the very nature of
Oh-hood, it would be surprising if this were not the case. To revert to
the example of ranapipiens, it would be surprising indeed if what
was said to be a frog - a 4) - never underwent such morphological
changes or a phylogenetic development. It would not be a frog - a
4) - if it did not. Therefore, so long as the reason for inclusion in
the species - in the category of (D - is present, the individual is a
member of that species: is a (D. Likewise with persons. As members
of the species homo sapiens it is necessary that they undergo certain
developmental changes on their way to adulthood. 8 They would not
be members of the species - would not be human beings - if they
did not. However, as long as the reasons for their inclusion in the
species homo sapiens are present, they will have to count as
members of that species, their undeveloped morphology notwithstanding. Consequently, at all stages they must count as persons.
8. Of special interest in this context are changes in and additions to the structure of
the central nervous system, in particular changes in the connecting structures of the
brain.
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The essential difference between the two positions that I have just
sketched is clearly this: The first involves a purely physiological
criterion of personhood whereas the second centres around a wholly
genetic conception. That is to say, whereas the first maintains that
the notion of personhood is not coextensive with that of membership
in the species homo sapiens, the second contends that personhood is
just such a species-specific characteristic and that the two are in fact
the same. Whereas the first perceives personhood to involve the
actual attainment of a certain stage of development of the genetic
potential inherent in the entity - in short, whereas the first equates
personhood with the actual possession of genetically programmed
physiological characteristics, the second equates possession of the
mere potential with membership in the species homo sapiens and
views any such genetically predetermined entity as a person, no
matter what its particular stage of genetic realization.
Neither of these positions is acceptable. The first would exclude
too much; the second, too little. The first would exclude children
from the rubric of persons since they do not attain the full realization
of their genetic potential until they are roughly 17 years of age; the
second would entail that each cell of an embryo at the blastular stage
of development must count as a person since each of these carries a
completely active genetic code and when cloned can develop into an
individual human being.
However, the failure of these two positions is instructive; for their
individual differences notwithstanding, ultimately their failure has a
common basis. Both identify personhood with the possession of a
biological property. In fact, they do more than this: both ignore the
fact that the notion of a person is not an inherently biological notion;
that being a person essentially involves moral, legal and
conventional parameters which a biological concept, no matter what
its nature, cannot and does not possess.
Therefore, in order to decide whether or not a given entity is a
person, we shall first have to see whether or not there are any
characteristics of individuals we recognize as persons that do not
reduce to mere biological properties without moral parameters.
Once in possession of such characteristics we can then go on to
inquire about criteria for the determination of personhood, so as to
be able to decide whether or not an entity is a person, a potential
person or not a person at all in any given case.
Are there such - is there such a characteristic? In brief, the
answer is yes. It consists in what might be called the constitutive
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potential for rational self-awareness. That is to say, an individual
may be counted as a person if and only if he is now thus self-aware
or can acquire such an awareness without it being necessary that he
undergo a fundamental constitutive change in his physiological
make-up in order to have such an awareness. 9 Of course, in order to
be useful, this definition of personhood requires a pragmatically
applicable criterion, since the characteristic itself can scarcely
function in that role. A notion that has lately begun to acquire some
currency in another area of biomedical ethics is that of brain-death:
an individual is said to be no longer a person when his nervous
system and in particular his brain has suffered such irreversible
damage that a return to consciousness (rational self-awareness) is
deemed impossible. This position is clearly predicated on the thesis
that personhood, self-awareness and awareness in general go hand
in hand with the presence of a certain type of functioning nervous
system. Suitably modified, this concept can find applicability in our
case: the presence of a nervous system complete in its basic cellular
structure vis-ii-vis the nuclei of the non-limbic cortex can count as a
determining criterion; for once the latter are present, the constitutive
basis for all later processes is given.
The next question that faces us is, whether or not this definition
of personhood is acceptable, and furthermore, whether or not the
criterion attached to it will work. In both instances, the answer is
yes. As to the first, the notion of personhood as thus defined is not a
biological or physiological notion, its criterion of applicability
notwithstanding. Instead, it focuses on that essential aspect of a
moral entity which already Aristotle saw as decisive. As to the
criterion, it too is effective. It permits us to rule out those cases
which we do not want while at the same time including those that
we want to capture. Children will count as persons because,
although their nervous systems are not quite as developed as those
of the adult members of the species homo sapiens, they are
sufficiently developed to permit such self-awareness.
It goes without saying that adults, by and large, fall into the same
category - "human vegetables" possibly being excepted. As to
fetuses, here there is no hard and fast answer. It all depends on their
stage of development. At two months, even three, they will not
meet the criterion. Therefore, while unquestionably members of the
9. Cf. E. W. Kluge, The Practice of Death (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1975) at 93ff.
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species homo sapiens, for all that they will not be persons. They
will be potential persons. They will contain the genetic basis for the
characteristic that I suggested was defining. At four months, the
question will be more difficult to decide, for the neural network will
be at that stage of development which constitutes a grey area for the
application of the criterion, and where no precise answer can be
given. 10 At seven months, there will be no question but that the
definition for personhood will be met, the undeveloped morphological nature of the fetus notwithstanding. Consequently, at this point,
we will be confronted not only with a member of the species homo
sapiensbut an actual and not merely potential person.
Is a fetus a person or a potential person? The answer once more
is, that it depends. Not, however, on whether or not it is a fully
developed human being, nor even on whether or not it is a
card-carrying member of the right zoological species. Instead, it
depends on whether or not the constitutive potential for
self-awareness is present. And that may vary from time to time and
case to case. An immediate corollary of this is that whereas it is
always correct to call a fetus a human being - perhaps an
undeveloped one, but a human being nevertheless - it is not always
correct to call it a person: at some earlier stages of its development it
is a potential person only, awaiting the realization of its potentiality
upon the attainment of certain morphological and functional
characteristics.
III. Rights ofPotentialPersons?
A fetus, then, at least in the early stages of its development, is
merely a potential person. Certainly, it is a potential person at that
stage of development when, typically, thalidomide damage occurs.
I therefore pass on to the second question indicated at the beginning:
do only persons in actu

-

actual persons -

have rights, or do

potential persons have rights as well?
By and large, traditional arguments against abortion and similar
acts visited upon fetuses have been to the effect that insofar as they
are potential persons, they do have rights. And not merely rights in
general, but those very same rights that fully actualized persons
10. Lest this be thought a fault of the criterion, I hasten to point out that this is the
case with all empirically applicable concepts. There is a grey transition area where
decisions must be made. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his PhilosophicalInvestigations,
has some rather good things to say about this topic.
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possess. After all, the only point on which they differ from actual
persons is that of the realization of their potential - and that is
already inherent in them. In other words, the continued material
identity of the fetus with its later stages, as well as its genetic
potential and present potential personhood, are seen as guaranteeing
it the same rights as those possessed by a person. Consequently,
both with respect to the right to life as well as with respect to the
right to non-negligent treatment, the fetus qua potential person and
the actual person (whatever its particular morphological state) are
said to be on a par. 1 1
However, its traditional nature notwithstanding, this sort of
reasoning is mistaken. Moral prerogatives and rights, at least in that
aspect of their nature which concerns me here, are like relations in
one fundamental respect: they require as it were a fundamentum
adscriptionis; a basis or ground which anchors their ascription to
any given individual. Therefore, whatever the moral prerogatives,
rights or privileges in question may be, they will attach to (belong
to) a given individual if and only if that individual evinces the
requisitefundamentumhere and now. In other words, the ascription
of moral prerogatives, rights and privileges to a fetus must find their
fundamentum adscriptionis in its present biological constitution.
Consequently, if the same rights and privileges attach to a fetus as to
an individual whom we normally consider a person, then both the
fetus and that individual must share the samefundamentum here and
now - or, failing that, both the fetus and the individual must have
constitutive characteristics which, although indeed distinct in
nature, nevertheless can ground the ascription of one and the same
series of fights.
Clearly, the first is not the case. This can be shown by
elimination. The prerogatives and privileges in question must
redound to the fetus either because (a) there is some characteristic
fundamentum that it possesses in common with developed
individuals here and now; or because (b) the ascription of the right is
based not on the actual presence of that fundamentum, but on its
potential possession by the fetus: i.e., on the fact that it is a potential
person. As to (a), even a brief glance at the present constitution of a
I1. Cf. J. J. Thomason, A Defense of Abortion (1971), 1 Philosophy and Public

Affairs 47, has a similar presentation of the traditional position. See also, R.
Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument (1971),

I Philosophy and

Public Affairs 67, who calls this or something like it the "extreme conservative
position". See also, Kluge, supra, note 9 at 6ff.

The Right to Life of Potential Persons 845

fetus rules this out. The constitution of a fetus at, say, three months
of age is not at all like that of the developed individual or person. In
fact, in many ways it does not differ essentially from that of a whole
host of other organisms which, if we knew no more about them, we
certainly would not credit with such rights simply because we would
not credit them with the constitutive potential of self-awareness in
the sense that I just explained. In other words, considered vis-at-vis
its constitution here and now, such a fetus lacks thatfundamentum
which, in the case of a developed individual, serves as the basis for
ascribing moral rights and privileges, and the presence of which
would permit us to say, independently of whatever else we might
know about the fetus, that it had these rights.
As to (b), it runs head-on into the fact that a potential is not a
constitutent of the present make-up of an entity. Instead, it is
described more correctly as the law-like expectation of certain
results based on present conditions if and when certain environmental, etc. conditions are met. In other words, the potential of a fetus
for rational awareness - i.e., to be a developed individual in the
requisite sense - is no more constitutive of it here and now than the
potential of being a diamond is constitutive of a lump of carbon here
and now. Therefore, the ascription of moral rights and privileges in
general cannot be based on the potential of a fetus.
This leaves the second general alternative: namely, that the
ascription of such rights proceeds on the basis of characteristics
which, although distinct in nature from those encountered in
developed individuals - although distinct from what I have called
the constitutive potential for rational awareness - nevertheless can
serve as such afundamentum. However, as in the case of (a) above,
this alternative is a conceptual dead-end. It entails that here and
now, independently of any consideration of its potentials as a
member of the species and its constitutive potential of rational
awareness, we should be able to determine that it has these rights.
And that we cannot do. If we could, then the whole question of
whether or not a fetus has the same rights as a developed member of
the species would not have arisen in the first place; or, if it had, it
could have been answered just as easily and in the same way as in
the case of the latter. The only way to avoid this outcome is to
adduce this consideration of the fetus' membership in the species
homo sapiens as a relevant parameter; i.e., to appeal to its status as
a potential person. And that lands the argument back with the first
alternative.
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In other words, the claim that a fetus has the same rights and
privileges as someone who is unequivocally a person goes through
if and only if the potential personhood of the fetus is considered a
relevant parameter. However, as we saw, the notion of potential
personhood that is here involved ultimately reduces to no more than
the claim of membership in the human species. And with this, it
becomes clear that the ascription of such rights and privileges to a
fetus as potential person is based on a gross confusion over what it is
that grounds their ascription: it is not humanity - i.e., membership
in the species homo sapiens - but personhood - the present
constitutive potential of rational awareness. And while humanity
(membership in the species) is undeniably present in the case of
fetuses, personhood in the sense I have indicated definitely is not. It
also becomes clear that what previously I had called the continued
material identity of the fetus with the later person is an irrelevant
consideration. All in all, therefore, it is not the case that with
respect to the relevant moral parameters (rights and privileges) a
fetus qua potential person and an actual person are on a par.
Of course, what I have just argued does not show, nor is it
intended to show, that fetuses, i.e., potential persons, have no
rights. It merely shows that if they do have rights, these must attach
to them by virtue of their nature as individual entities here and now,
and are not derivable from their present merely potential
personhood or present merely potential constitution. In other words,
whatever rights they are said to have must be argued for on the
independent grounds of what is presently the case.
IV. Right to Life and Right to Non-negligent Treatment:
Independent Rights?
There is one more question to be considered before I address myself
to the final problem: the question, namely, of whether or not the
right to life and the right to non-negligent treatment can be had
independently of each other.
Fortunately, the answer to this is easily given: it is a fundamental
moral principle that if (D and •I are rights related in such a way that
the exercise of 4) is a pre-condition for the exercise of T, then to
have the right to P is eo ipso to have the right to (D. The right to life
and the right to non-negligent treatment are just such rights. The
latter presupposes the former, since the right to a certain sort of
treatment cannot attach to an individual unless that individual has a
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right to live.' 2 Therefore, if a fetus has the right to non-negligent
treatment, it will also have the right to life.
V. Non-Actionable Abortion: A Legal Contradiction?
At this point, I should like to return to the problem which I posed at
the beginning: do the right to sue for thalidomide-engendered
damages and the susceptibility to abortion on part of a fetus
constitute a contradiction in the law? It is now easily demonstrated
that this is in fact the case. For consider: on the one hand (by general
consent and custom) the right to non-negligent treatment while in
utero attaches in the relevant sense only to persons. Consequently,
it does not attach to non-persons. Otherwise, in utero modification
of non-persons, such as occurs in the case of genetic manipulation
of great apes would be immoral as well as illegal. Therefore, if an
entity has the right to sue for damages sustained in utero due to such
causes, then that individual must be a person at the time the damage
occurred. Consequently, from the fact that individuals do have the
right to sue for such damages, it follows that they must be
considered to have been persons at that particular time of their
development. 13 Therefore, to abort such an individual at that
particular stage would be to kill, with full knowledge, purpose and
intent, not a potential person but a person. In a word, it would be to
commit murder.
On the other hand, however, the law is also quite explicit in
permitting the abortion of such fetuses and does not consider it
murder. In and by itself, of course, this need not constitute a
contradiction if it could be argued that the possession of personhood
and the right to non-negligent treatment while in utero do not entail
the right to life. However, as my previous argument has shown, this
possibility is ruled out. The right to non-negligent treatment
presupposes the right to life. Therefore, it follows that by virtue of
being accorded the right to sue for damages the fetus is granted the
right to life and is admitted to have the status of a person after all.
VI. Conclusion
The contradiction in the law that I indicated in the beginning is
12. The converse of this need not be - and in fact is not - true.
13. Unless, of course, it is argued that the right can be acquired too retroactively,
as it were ex post facto. But that, clearly, is unacceptable because it would
contradict the theory.
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patent. To be sure, it could be resolved without altering any aspect
of current legal practice. It would merely require that we reject all
that I have argued and assert either that the right to life is not
presupposed by the right to non-negligent treatment; or that rights
can be acquired retroactively - as it were, ex post facto; or that
fetuses, one and all, are potential persons and that with respect to
these, none of the standard moral considerations hold. Still other
alternatives suggest themselves. However, I should like to suggest
that these alternatives, together or singly, are too high a price to pay
for consistency in a legal situation which may be adjusted without
such desperate expedients - and where in any case moral as well as
juridical expediency would be best served by consistency in the
notion of a person.

